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CONTRACTS - AGENCY - STATUTE OF FRAUDS - SATISFACTION OF THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS BY A MEMORANDUM SIGNED BY AN AGENT ACTING
FOR A PARTIALLY DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL - Plaintiff engaged a Michigan corporation to negotiate the purchase for him of certain shares of stock. The
corporation obtained the promise of defendant to sell the stock to the corporation
as agent for an undisclosed principal. The corporation, acting as the agent for
an undisclosed vendor (defendant), sent a written confirmation of the sale to
the plaintiff and sent a similar memorandum to the defendant which was signed
by the corporation as agent for an undisclosed vendee (plaintiff). The next
day defendant notified the corporation that he refused to deliver the shares.
Plaintiff brought a suit in equity for the specific performance of the contract on
the ground that these shares would give him actual control of a corporation.
Defendant demurred, claiming the contract was unenforceable under the Michigan equivalent of section I 7 of the statute of frauds. Held, that the memorandum
was sufficient to satisfy the statute, the court placing its decision squarely on the
Restatement of Agency rule 1 to the effect that a memorandum signed by an
agent, whether for a disclosed, undisclosed, or partially disclosed principal is
sufficient to bind the principal, though the agent be not bound.2 Dodge v. Blood,
299 Mich. 364, 300 N. w. I2I (1941).

AGENCY RESTATEMENT, § 153 (1933).
The Michigan statute specifically includes choses in action, so that question was
not raised. See Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), § 9443, "a sale of any goods or choses in
action of the value of one hundred (100) dollars"; Finkelstein v. Dinnan, 221 Mich.
493, 191 N. W. 24 (1922). Many American courts have included them without a
statutory provision. 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 521 (1936). Michigan so
held even before the statute included choses. Sprague v. Hosie, 15 5 Mich. 30, II 8
N. W. 497 (1908). The Uniform Sales Act, § 4, enacted in many states, provides
for this too. Vold, "The Application of the Statute of Frauds Under the Uniform Sales
Act," 15 MINN. L. REV. 391 (1931); 15 N. Y. UNiv. L. Q. REv. 465 (1938).
The English courts hold to the contrary as to choses in action, WILLISTON, supra;
Willis, "The Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism," 3 lNo. L. J. 427, 528 (1928);
Colonial Bank v. Whitney, 30 Ch. Div. 261 at 283 (1885). The stocks had already
been issued and are documented choses so these two question were not raised in the
1 l

2
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Since the transaction is under section I 7 and not section 4 ( covering land
contracts), only a memorandum of the contract and not the contract itself need
be in writing. It is now universally agreed that this memorandum must include
the parties to the contract 8 and it is upon this idea that the present conflict is
based. All courts agree that an agent who signs for a principal disclosed in the
writing binds his principal/ and with almost equal unanimity they agree that
an agent who signs with no indication of his agency likewise binds his principal.5 The basis for the latter proposition is uncertain,6 and although one writer
goes so far as to call it an anomaly, it is undoubtedly the rule,1 except in the
principal case. See WILLISTON, supra. The question of the agent acting for both principals was not raised and there is ample authority upholding such a relationship in
these cases. These are usually cases of autioneers or brokers and as long as the fact is
fully disclosed the principals are both bound. 15 N. C. L. REV. 81 at 84 (1936);
2 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., § 2412 (1914); Straesser-Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar
Refining Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1925) 8 F. (2d) 601, cert. denied 270 U. S. 642, 46
S. Ct. 208 (1926); and the principal case of course. See also 27 C. J. 294 (1922).
Neither was there evidence in the principal case of any written authority for the
agent to make such contracts, but practically all authorities agree none is necessary even
in these cases within the Statute of Frauds. l WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed., § 276,
2 id., § 489; l AGENCY RESTATEMENT, § 30 (1933); Bay State Milling Co. v.
Saginaw Baking Co., 225 Mich. 557, 196 N. W. 204 (1923). See also 27 C. J. 295
(1922). This rule is apparently inconsistent with the general rule that an agent's
authority must be given by an instrument equally formal with that required by the
authorized acts (e.g., sealed contracts), but it is the rule in almost all jurisdictions.
8
This has been held by most courts to necessitate naming which is buyer and
which is seller, though a few courts have disagreed. 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed.,
§ 569 (1936); 70 A. L. R. 196 (1931); Willis, "The Statute of Frauds-A Legal
Anachronism," 3 IND. L. J. 427, 528 (1928). The memorandum in the principal
case satisfies this requirement.
4
I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed.,§ 281 (1936). And see 2 AGENCY RESTATEMENT, § 320, comment a (1933).
5
MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., §§ 1713-1716 (1914); 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS,
rev. ed., § 569 (1936). This means the parol evidence rules as to disclosure of a
principal when the agent signs apply to cases within the statute too. See 27 C. J. 383
(1922), especially note 96 (a). It is always a matter for the jury to decide what the
parties did mean, with the help of parol evidence, if the terms are ambiguous. See note
10, infra.
6
Some of the suggested theories are ( l) equitable subrogation to the rights of the
agent against his principal, ( 2) deceit by the principal in holding someone out as a
principal, (3) principal caused third party to act to his detriment and so assumpsit
lies, and (4) benefits received by the principal. For the supporters of each and criticisms see: Ames, "Undisclosed Principal-His Rights and Liabilities," 18 YALE
L. J. 443 (1909); Lewis, "The Liability of the Undisclosed Principal in Contract,"
9 CoL. L. REV. u6 (1909); 3 C. J. S. 172 (1936); Humphrey v. Bussey, 99 Fla.
1249, 128 So. 841 (1930); Owen v. King, (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) 84 S. W. (2d)
743. One wonders if all these are really anything but suggested rationalizations to
justify the judicial amendment of the original language and meaning of the statute.
1 2 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., § 1731, p. 1315 (1914), says: "The rule itself
is doubtless an anomaly, but even so it is undoubtedly as well settled as any other rule
in the law of agency." See also 15 N. C. L. REV. 81 at 84 (1936). That the rule exists
nowhere else, see 2 MECHEM, supra; 13 CoRN. L. Q. 303 at 308 (1928) (Scotch and
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cases of negotiable and sealed instruments. 8 The principal case is in between; the
agency, but not the principal, is disclosed, creating a partially disclosed principal
situation.9 As the court in the principal case points out, the majority of courts
say that where the agent himself is not bound 10 the principal, when unnamed,
cannot be held.11 The basis for this distinction seems to be that if the agent is
German law have no such rule;- Italian and French laws except commercial contracts);
3 L. Q. REV. 359 (1887). There are exceptions to the liability of the undisclosed principal, even though found by the jury to be bound: (1) when the principal has been
led by the third person's actions to pay his agent----see 2 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed.,
§ 1737 et seq. (1914); 2 AM. JuR. 313 (1936), and (2) an election by the third person to hold one or the other, which raises the difficult problem of what constitutes an
election----see I WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 289 (1936), supporting the
minority rule that actual satisfaction is the only fair rule; 2 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed.,
§§ 1737, 1750-1772 (1914); 2 AM. JuR. 314 (1936); 3 C. J. S. 175 (1936);
Merrill, "Election Between Agent and Undisclosed Principal," 12 NEB. L. BuL. JOO
(1933).
8 At common law, unnamed principals in sealed contracts were not liable, and even
where states have "attempted" to abolish seals, the overruling of this very technical
distinction has not always followed. See 6 FoRDHAM L. REv. 496 (1937); 34 CoL. L.
REv. 952 (1934); 23 MicH. L. REv. 67 (1924); 30 MICH. L. REv. 462 (1932);
2 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., § 1734 (1914); I AGENCY RESTATEMENT, § 191
(1933), 2 id.,§ 296; 2 AM. JuR. 310-3II (1936); Hill v. Gratigny Plateau Development Corp., (C. C. A. 6th, 1931) 52 F. (2d) 142. The same rule holds as to
negotiable instruments, perhaps with more reason, but doubtfully since most courts place
it on the artificial ground that the subsequent holders contract only on the basis of the
signed names. See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw, 6th ed., (Beutel)
295-316 (1938); II RocKY MT. L. REv. 59 (1938) (discussing the rule in some
jurisdictions that the original payee may have an action); 2 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d
ed.,§ 1736 (1914); 2 AM. JuR. 312 (1936).
9
The court adopted the definitions of the terms "disclosed," "partially disclosed,"
and "undisclosed" given by l AGENCY RESTATEMENT, § 4 (1933).
10
The question whether the agent is bound when the principal is partially disclosed
has been a difficult problem for the courts and has led to artificial rules based on differences in phrasing such as "agent," "agent for," "agent of," "as agent," etc. 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., §§ 28 5, 286 ( l 936) ( to the effect that American courts
generally hold the agent liable on the ground that the words are descriptic personae
only, while the English courts hold to the contrary); 72 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 49 (1923);
42 L. R. A. (N. S.) l (1913); l AGENCY RESTATEMENT, § 149 (1933); 2 id., § 323
( 2). Liability should be based on what the parties would reasonably mean, and certainly the agent should not be relieved too readily. See 72 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 185
(1924); 26 lLL. L. REv. 74 (1931) (to the effect that most of the difficulty arises from
misapplication of the rule as stated by 1 WILLISTON, SALES, 2d ed.,§ 105a (1924)].
The court in the principal case refused to place the decision on the ground that the agent
corporation was bound too, as they indicated it probably was. It likewise refused to
place it on the ground of tying the two papers together, which would have disclosed the
principals. See note 20, infra.
11 For comprehensive lists of the pertinent cases, see 1 WILLISTON, SALES, 2d. ed.,
§ 105a (1924); 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed.,§§ 569,577 (1936); 23 A. L. R.
932 (1923); 27 C. J. 276, note 45 (1922); 25 R. C. L. 658 (1919). The A. L. R.
note lists Kentucky, Ohio, and South Carolina as making no distinction, and possibly
Massachusetts, but doubtful because of McGovern v. Hern, 153 Mass. 308, 26 N. E.
861 (1891). The most recent case following the majority rule in making the distinction is Irvmor Corp. v. Rodewald, 253 N. Y. 472, 171 N. E. 747 (1930). See Lerand
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bound, parol evidence is admissible to explain the identity of the party named
in the memorandum; while if the agency but not the principal is disclosed so that
the agent is not bound, to admit parol evidence is not to explain the identity of
any party bound by the contract but to add a party, because the agent, though
his name is on the paper, is not there as a contracting party. 12 There would
seem to be two fallacies in this reasoning. In the first place the courts have
interpreted even section 4 to mean unenforceable only,1 8 so the statute does not
mean there is no agreement but rather that it is unenforceable, and except for
the statute of frauds such contracts clearly would be valid.14 A fortiori this can
be the only logical interpretation of section 17 where the courts allow subsequent
memorandums to satisfy the statute.15 If there was n9 agreement, a subsequent
memorandum would hardly create one. Secondly, there certainly can be no
greater danger of undermining the purpose of the statute to discover the partially
disclosed principal by parol evidence than to discover the completely undisclosed
principal. The expressed purpose of the statute in requiring a writing is violated
as much in one case as in the other; the reasoning employed in the majority rule
is equally applicable to the undisclosed agency cases.16 Since the statute of frauds
Corp. v. Meltzer, 267 N. Y. 343, 196 N. E. 283 (1935). Except for the principal
case, only one case has specifically adopted the Restatement rule, Estate of Kaiser, 217
Wis. 4, 258 N. W. 177 (1935) {of doubtful weight since probably dictum). Miller,
"The Restatement of the Law of Agency," 20 MARQUETTE L. REv. 141 at 149
(1936). Pennsylvania can probably now be added to the list of states making no distinction without reference to the Restatement. Penn Discount Corp. v. Sharp, 125 Pa.
Super. 171, 189 A. 749 (1937) [cited as establishing the Pennsylvania rule in Tate v.
Shober, (D. C. Pa. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 478]. The A. L. R. note lists as supporting the
majority view O'Sullivan v. Overton, 56 Conn. 102, 14 A. 300 (1888) [but see to
contrary, in language at least, Merrill v. Kenyon, 48 Conn. 314 (1880)]; Tombs v.
Basye, 65 Mo. App. 30 {1895) [but see Mantz v. Maguire, 52 Mo. App. 136 (1892),
which is more in point and to the contrary]; and Mayer v. Adrian, 77 N. C. 83 (1877)
[but see Proctor v. Finley, II9 N. C. 536, 26 S. E. 128 (1896), which is certainly
contrary to the reasoning of McGovern v. Hern, 153 Mass. 308, 26 N. E. 861 (1891),
and to many of the cases cited in l WILLISTON, SALES, 2d ed., § 105a, note 98 (1924)].
12
Irvmor Corp. v. Rodewald, 253 N. Y. 472 at 476, 171 N. E. 747 (1930),
stating, "On the face of the writing there is no agreement with any one." Justice
Younger in Lovesy v. Palmer, [1916] 2 Ch. 233 at 243-244, explains the distinction
on this ground. Grafton v. Cummings, 99 U. S. 100 (1879), and Moore v. Adams,
15 3 Ga. 709, II 3 S. E. 38 3 ( l 922), seem to base the distinction on the necessity of
parol evidence to show the principal. But the same holds true for the completely undisclosed principal cases. All the cases seem to admit that actual knowledge of the identity
of the principal is irrelevant on the ground that the memorandum must satisfy the
statute of frauds. See the principal case, 299 Mich. at 374, and Jarrett v. Hunter, 34
Ch. Div. 182 at 185 (1886). See also 27 C. J. 298 (1922). Yet they all allow parol
evidence at least where even the agency is undisclosed.
18
2 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., §§ 525-527 (1936).
14
14 NEB. L. BuL. 400 (1936); Moore v. Consolidated Products Co., (C. C. A.
8th, 1926) IO F. (2d) 319; l MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed.,§ II76 (1914).
15
See 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 567 (1936), and cases there cited.
Also, Bird v. Munroe, 66 Me. 337 (1877), requiring that the writing be before trial.
16
I WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 286 ( 1936), to the effect that it really
does not jibe with the mutual assent idea. See also 26 ILL. L. REv. 74 (1931), accepting the reasoning given for the distinction as sound.
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still exists in one form or another, the Michigan court has made a commendable
decision, especially since the decision is specifically based on the Restatement
rule.17 The case is equally important in exemplifying again the much needed
repeal of at least sections 4 and I 7 of the statute of frauds and their American
counterparts.18 That the statute has been judicially amended, if not repealed in
some cases, is unquestionable; 19 e.g., oral rescission of contracts, satisfaction by
part performance for section 4, disclosing unmentioned principals, promises to
debtors rather· than creditors not within the statute, restitution for benefits received, tying several separate memorandums together, equitable estoppel, only
possibility of performance within one year on one side required, admission of
oral evidence to show the contents of a lost memorandum, and the rule that the
statute does not apply to contracts under seal. 20 Legal scholars, practictioners,
and judges alike agree that the statute has long since served its useful purpose
and should now be scrapped. 21 Recent reports seem to indicate a revival of this
agitation. 22
11

The court in the principal case, 299 Mich. at 377, specifically accepts the
1 AGENCY RESTATEMENT, § 153 (1933), rule as the ratio decidendi of the case. That
it results in one more liberalization of the statute is obvious.
18 These two clauses have caused the greatest amount of litigation and have been
singled out as particularly needing repeal. Willis, "The Statute of Frauds-A Legal
Anachronism," 3 IND. L. J. 427, 528 (1928), especially pp. 428-429.
19 However, in some cases the courts have been strict in the application of the
statute, such as, requirement by some that memorandum be delivered, 14 M1cH. S. B.
J.* 141 (1934); memorandum must be in existence before trial, Bird v. Munroe, 66
Me. 337 (1877) (see note 15, supra, for criticism of the rule); vendor and vendee
must be named as such (note 3, supra}; and of course the distinction as to partially
disclosed principal's liability.
20 A discussion of and authority for some or all of these will be found in 6 FoRDHAM L. REv. 496 (1937); 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs, rev. ed., §§ 504, 505, 527-539,
592 (1936); Willis, "The Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism," 3 IND. L. J.
427, 528 (1928); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 2d. ed., § 457 (1920); Green v.
Brookins, 23 Mich. 48 (1871); 25 VA. L. REv. 241 (1938) [condemning Consolidated Products Co. v. Blue Valley Creamery Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) 97 F. (2d)
23]; 27 GEORGETOWN L. J. 99 (1938) (upholding the same case); 37 M1cH. L. REv.
673 (1939); Summers, "The Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to the Statute of Frauds,"
79 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 440 (1931). As an example of how far the courts have gone,
see Vogel v. Shaw, 42 Wyo. 33, 294 P. 687 (1930), criticized in 44 HARV. L. REv.
n47 (1931); 35 CoL. L. REv. 1324 (1935); Zimmerman Bros. & Co. v. First Nat.
Bank of Stevens Point, 219 Wis. 427, 263 N. W. 361 (1935).
21
Willis, "The Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism," 3 IND. L. J. 427, 528
(1928); 13 CoRN. L. Q. 303 at 310 (1928); and Ireton, "Should We Abolish the
Statute of Frauds?" 72 U. S. L. REV. 195 ( I 93 8) are representative of many articles.
The principal case shows the continued existence of the problem in this country, and a
recent note, 8 SoLICITOR 147 (1941), indicates that it still plagues the English courts.
Fay v. Miller, Wilkins & Co., no L. J. (Ch.) 124 (1941).
22
The English Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report (1937), recommended the repeal of § 17 (now part of the Sales of Goods Act of 1893). The New
York Law Revision Committee is re-examining the statute of frauds. 2 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS, rev. ed., 61-62 (1941 Supp.). The New York Civil Practice Act, § 342,
(2) added by Laws of 1936, c. 685, moved in the right direction by making the rule
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as to sealed contracts the same as for unsealed (for the rule repealed, see note 8, supra).
One cannot help but speculate whether it would not have been better if the courts had
applied the statute strictly, undoubtedly forcing its repeal long ago. Its repeal probably
would have prevented more frauds than has its enforcement.

